20.1.13

βιωσιμότητα του χρέους και χρηματοδότηση

Greece’s debt would be considerably higher than in the original EFF-supported program, peaking at close to 200 percent of GDP and only slowly declining to 150–160 percent of GDP in 2020.

OSI 2: Through the Eurogroup statements on November 29 and December 13, and via separate interactions with the Managing Director, they have made clear that they will:
(i) provide 1.4 percent of GDP in debt relief in early 2014 (provided the primary balance target for 2013 is met); and
(ii) take measures in 2015 to ensure that debt drops to 124 percent of GDP by 2020 and substantially below 110 percent of GDP by 2022 (provided Greece’s primary balance swings to a surplus as programmed in 2014).

measures in 2015: staff’s assessment at this point is that some combination of haircuts on outstanding GLF loans, close to zero interest rates on GLF loans and lower rates on EFSF loans, or long-term transfers will be necessary

Greece’s headline debt—peaking at about 180 percent of GDP in 2013—overstates the debt burden [!!!]

Greece also reached understandings with its European partners on additional financing for the program period: a total of roughly €26 billion in new financing was agreed, leaving a gap of €5.5–9.5 billion (depending on how transitory movements in deposits are accounted for), falling entirely in 2015–16:
  • Greece’s European partners agreed to a deferral and capitalization of EFSF interest payments falling due for one decade (providing an estimated €11.5 billion in financing through 2016).
  • The ECB agreed, on a preliminary basis, to a rollover of maturing Greek bonds held by the national central banks (ANFA) (generating about €5.6 billion in further financing through 2016). To the degree this rollover is not confirmed by March, the euro member states agreed to provide equivalent relief via other means.
 At the request of its euro area partners, Greece agreed to delay the programmed €9 billion net redemption of Treasury bills now held by banks. With only a small share of the stock of Treasury bills expected to be eligible for use as collateral for BoG funding beyond Q1 2013, Greece’s banks will need to make room for this through other adjustments in their balance sheets (likely involving higher ELA and higher access to ECB instruments which should be facilitated by the ECB’s decision in mid-December 2012 to expand the list of eligible collateral)

There also remain good prospects that financing will be available beyond the second program year, in particular to cover the €9½ billion gap for 2015–16. Euro area members confirmed their previous commitment to provide adequate support to Greece during the period of the program and beyond, provided that Greece fully complies with the requirements and objectives of the program.

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πριν το PSI plus (OSI 1), το χρέος πήγαινε για 150%ΑΕΠ@2020
ΜΑ ΠΟΣΟ ΕΞΩ ΕΠΕΣΑΝ ΕΝΑ ΧΡΟΝΟ ΠΡΙΝ;;;;

ΔΥΣΤΥΧΩΣ για όλους όσους μένουν στη χώρα, αργεί πάρα πολύ η διαδικασία διακανονισμού του χρέους
πάντως το ΔΝΤ, ορίζει ξεκάθαρα μια τέτοια διαδικασία και υποθέτει τι θα περιλαμβάνει: απευθείας κούρεμα, (έως και) μηδενικά επιτόκια ή μακροχρόνιες μεταβιβάσεις από τις υπόλοιπες χώρες προς την Ελλάδα

το ΔΝΤ θεωρεί τον παραπάνω πίνακα ως επιτυχία (πληρωμές τόκων - βλέπετε πόσο αυξάνει το 2020 και μετά, σε επίπεδα ..χθεσινά και σημερινά)

στο σκέλος της χρηματοδότησης, ΟΛΟΙ αναμένουν απαντήσεις και από την ΕΚΤ (μέχρι Μάρτιο)


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