Την αλήθεια την μαθαίνεις απ'έξω!

Ένα πολύ ενδιαφέρον άρθρο για την Ελλάδα και τα προβλήματά της.
Παραθέτω μερικά σημεία, χωρίς όμως να κάνω μετάφραση, και προσθέτω δικά μου σχόλια, κόκκινα και bold έμφασης.

..EMU membership no longer gives an automatic guarantee of oncost-free external financing and if you look at the names of the other countries lining up in the queue behind Greece - Italy, Spain and Portugal in particular - you can begin to see the outline of a contagion mechanism whereby the coming to reality of the worst case Greek scenario might just extend itself into a problem of sufficient magnitude to transmit Greek vulnerabilities across and into the entire euro area.
Προσθέστε επίσης Ιρλανδία, Βέλγιο και Αυστρία - καθόλου αυθαίρετα όλες αυτές τις χώρες - ώστε να έχετε υπόψη σας ολόκληρο το διαφαινόμενο domino εντός ΕΕ.

Μια διαπίστωση για το εγχώριο τραπεζικό σύστημα:
The first of the things which has changed .... is the soundness and stability of what was then seen as being a very well funded and liquid banking system. Only last Friday Moody’s Investors Service announced they had changed the outlook on the bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs) and long-term deposit and debt ratings of four Greek banks - to negative from stable.
Τα ίδια και οι του S&P...

Ανάθεμα εάν έχει γραφτεί στα ελληνικά μια τέτοια παράγραφος όσον αφορά το ελληνικό bailout του τραπεζικού συστήματος...
Προσέξτε ότι ο αρθρογράφος σημειώνει, ως απόλυτο μέγεθος σύγκρισης, το % επί του ΑΕΠ...

Piraeus Bank has said it will hold a shareholders’ meeting on January 23 to seek approval for a 370 million euro issue of preferred shares to be sold to the state. Under the terms of the bailout plan, the Greek government may spend up to 5.0 billion euros (of the 28 billion euros total, or a little over 2% of GDP) on boosting bank capital ratios via the purchase of preferred shares. These shares will pay the government a 10 percent dividend, and banks using the facility will need to accept a state representative with a right to veto dividend policy and executive pay on their boards. Banks will also have the right to buy back the preferred shares no sooner than July 1, 2009.

Eπιπλέον το άλλο εγχώριο πρόβλημα,
...the other worrying development we are seeing in Greece at the present time ... is the movement in what is know as the yield spreads.
και το ..ζουμί:
These widening spreads mean more expensive bond auctions for the Greek government, and this is just where the trouble comes, since
-Greece has a very hefty accumulated debt to continually refinance (around 90% GDP), and it is partly because
-investors don’t see how a government with a damaged banking system and an economy which may soon start shrinking as the recession bites can shoulder the weight of this debt,
especially given the evident difficulty faced by the Greek government in enforcing measures to reduce it, that the widening is occuring.

Και μια σύνδεση Ελλάδας-Ισπανίας, που θα μπορούσε να είναι κι αλλες από τις χώρες που αναφέρθηκαν στην αρχή, που είναι η "ψυχή" του ποστ:
we should be aware that events in Greece, depending on how badly things go, or how quickly they go bad, could end up cutting the available time for Spain even further, via a nasty little process which is ferquently known to go to work during financial crises: regional contagion
Ντόμινο!
Αν και το σώζει λίγο πιο κάτω:
I doubt we are likely to see a similar chain reaction process just yet, but the severity of the social backdraft we have scene following the incident should serve as a warning to us all of just how delicate this situation now is, and just how easily things could be knocked off balance.

Ελλάδα: το διπλό πρόβλημα:
The core of the problem we have before us lies in the Greek twin deficit - Greece has a very large and continuing current account defcit (around 15% of GDP, see chart below) and a very large accumulated government debt (around 90% of GDP)
Και σύντομη συμπυκνωμένη εγχώρια ιστορία (από το '99 της ΟΝΕ):
Part of the reason for the recent surge in Greek external debt has been a rapid rise in domestic investment which was not matched by a similar increase in national saving - in fact household savings have been more or less stagnant - and this has meant that the gap between national saving and investment has been steadily growing since 2001 - increasing from 10.5% of GDP in 2001 to nearly 15% in 2006.
Most of the additional gap has been due to a rise in net indebtedness by the household sector.
To a large extent the decline in household saving and the increased demand for housing as a private investment vehicle can be explained by the increased access to and demand for credit in the context of financial liberalization and the lower interest rates which have followed from Greece’s euro participation.
Undoubtedly during the years in which Greece “enjoyed” negative real interest rates, it seem a much more attractive proposition to buy a piece of property whose price it was imagined would “never fall” rather then watch savings steadily lose their value in time deposits which were effectively being ravaged by infaltion attrition.
On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that gross Greek household debt - at a little over 40% of GDP - never reached the heady levels attained in Spain of around 90% of GDP.
Μετά τα νοικοκυριά και τον κλάδο της αγοράς κατοικίας, στις επιχειρήσεις:
In contrast, the Greek corporate sector has been running a net savings surplus throughout the entire period (and this of course is another big difference from Spain), with rising saving repeatedly exceeding investment. This notable increase in corporate saving has largely been the result of the strong profitability in the shipping and financial sectors, and it is this profitability which is now, suddenly, under threat in the current downturn.
Οι οποίες επίσης δεν αισθάνονται καλά τελευταία...

Και λίγο πλάκα:
Greek government debt, on the other hand is somewhere in the region of 90% of GDP, while the deficit is currently somewhere around 3% of GDP, but none of us can really be too sure of all this, since the goalposts seem to be being constantly moved in more than the football stadia down in Greece, and while it would be an exaggeration to say the data changes on a weekly basis.. Such shortcomings in Greek public finance statistics

Και βέβαια, κανείς δεν πρέπει να ξεχνάει την μεγαλύτερη εγχώρια πληγή, τον πληθωρισμό:
If we examine the inflation chart (see below), we will find that Greek annual inflation has also been hovering around the 4% mark since the start of the century, a clear two percentage points above the ECB inflation target, and also two percentage points over the ECB policy rate during the key period from June 2003 and December 2005 (when the rate was held at 2% offering monetary conditions which were far too loose for several key members of the eurozone and in the process fuelling housing bubbles in a number of zone member states)

Το (διπλό) λάθος της εγχώριας οικονομικής διοίκησης στα "καλά χρόνια":
The Greek government, on noting the signs of overheating should have moved to a restrictive fiscal stance - in other words it should have been running a surplus, and a big one, of possibly 2% or 3% of GDP - but as we have seen, just the opposite was the case, and at the same time as monetary policy was excessively accommodative fiscal policy was busy pumping in even more juice.

Η ελληνική ατζέντα μεταρρυθμίσεων:
The Much Needed Pension Reform
Greek parliament last March approved a law...
Experts predict a collapse of the system in 15 years
The working age population is soon set to start declining as a proportion of the total population.
Η δυσκολία είναι ότι δεν υπάρχουν νέοι εργαζόμενοι και οι συνταξιούχοι αυξάνονται γρήγορα...

Privatisations To Pay Down Some Of The Debt
Greece’s New Democracy government has already
-auctioned stakes in Greece’s largest ports in Piraeus and Thessaloniki, and
-sold a stake in telecoms company OTE.
It has also pledged to push ahead with the privatization of several state-owned companies, such as
Olympic Airways and
Postal Savings Bank.
Other assets to go on the auction block may include Athens International Airport
Μερικά από αυτά είτε ΔΕΝ έγιναν είτε απλά είναι υπό συζήτηση χρόνια...

Wages and Salaries
One of the key areas of controversy in recent weeks has been a law which effectively ends the employees’ right to collective wage contracts (Spain, be warned) and which won approval in the Greek parliament last August
???

Και μια κουβέντα για τους γιατρούς του ΔΝΤ:
One key feature in all this woe has to be a political process that is extremely ineffective, and driven by the fact that no one likes to hear bad news, and that the last thing a politician is able to say is tighten-up your belts now lads and lasses, we are in for a rough ride.
But isn’t this just how the IMF gets such a bad name for itself, since the IMF doctors get called in just where the domestic political process breaks down, and where local politicians haven’t the ability to stand up in front of their citizens and say, it’s going to have to be like this, I’m afraid. Isn’t this what just happened in Ukraine, Hungary and Latvia? And then people say, those “nasty folk” at the IMF, they cut pensions everywhere they go, and wages are down 8% in Hungary, and 15% in Latvia once the IMF get to run the show.

Οι ρυθμοί ανάπτυξης στην Ελλάδα
(τα παρελθόντα στοιχεία δεν εγγυόνται μελλοντικές αποδόσεις..)
Greek economic growth is now slowing rapidly.
Quarter on quarter growth in Q3 2008 was 0.4%, and almost all the growth the economy has been getting this year (including that sharp spike you can see in Q2 in the chart below) comes from earnings from shipping services, earnings which are now falling dramatically as global trade starts to contract.
the Greek economy should start contracting - and thus formally enter recession in Q1 2009, at the latest
...
further slowdown in private consumption
Government consumption is expected to move more or less in line with GDP, while public investment is expected to rebound in 2009, largely reflecting an accelerating pace in the implementation of EU Structural Funds.
This reality is reflected in the recent statement by central bank govenor George Provopoulos that he hoped the bank bailout plan would be able to keep the country’s credit expansion pace at 10 percent next year (down from around 18.1 percent currently).
Even were this to be achieved (which is far from clear), as we have seen in Spain it will lead to a sharp contraction in an economy which had grown accustomed to new credit generation at twice that rate, and especially given the governments inability to step in and offer any fiscal support.

Κατασκευαστικός κλάδος:
has now been slowing since Q3 2007, when it hit around 7.5% of GDP, and was down to 5.4% in Q3 2008

Βιομηχανία:
is also now falling, by 4.5% in October, and the November manufacturing PMI registered a series low of 42.3 indicating even faster contractions in the pipeline. Greek industry has been getting some uplift from the economic boom in South Eastern Europe, and since that is now well and truly over, we should expect the manufacturing downturn to be sharp and sustained.

Ναυτιλία:
George Economou, Greek shipping billionaire and Chairman and CEO of DryShips recently characterized the current collpase in the Baltic Dry Index (of bulk charter cargo rates) as something like “a nuclear explosion” for those in the shipping industry. The index, which measures world shipping charges for raw materials, has plummeted from a high of 11,793 in May to 672
Kriton Lendoudis, managing director of Athens-based Evalend Shipping Co., ... concludes, “The next 24 months do not look very optimistic.”

Τελικό σχόλιο:
So my feeling is that - taking all the above elements into account - we should expect Greek economic performance to deteriorate at a rate and to an extent which may surprise the casual observer of economic events. Those who have already been following closely what has happened in countries like Spain, Latvia and Romania should, however, be fully prepared for what is now to come.

Δικό μου τελικό σχόλιο:
Η Ελλάδα είναι σε δύσκολη κατάσταση.
Η Ελλάδα έχει βρεθεί πολλές φορές σε δύσκολη κατάσταση.

Η Ελλάδα διαθέτει ευρώ, η ΟΝΕ περιλαμβάνει την Ελλάδα ενώ δεν υπάρχει μηχανισμός εξόδου από το ευρώ.
Η ΕΕ θα δώσει τη λύση (θα μας δανείσει), επιβάλλοντας τους δικούς της όρους, όπως επέκταση της φορολογικής βάσης ή/και μοιράζοντας στα ισχυρά μέλη της νέα έργα υποδομής, προκειμένου ως δανειστής να λάβει τα λεφτά της πίσω.

Σημειώνω ακόμα ότι η Ελλάδα είναι στο ξεκίνημα του "φαγώματος" του Δ' ΚΠΣ (2007-2013), διαφημιζόμενου και ως ΕΣΠΑ, ύστερα από τα Μεσογειακά Ολοκληρωμένα Προγράμματα (ΜΟΠ: 1984 - 1989 έως και 1993), Α' ΚΠΣ (1989-1993), Β' ΚΠΣ (1994-1999), Γ' ΚΠΣ (2000-2006). Τα Α'-Β'-Γ' ΚΠΣ έχουν μείνει στην ιστορία και ως "πακέτα Ντελόρ-δα".

Εάν δεν μας βοηθήσει η ΕΕ, και πχ χρεωκοπήσουμε ή πάμε στο ΔΝΤ, τότε η ΟΝΕ δείχνει ότι:
α. δεν ενδιαφέρεται για τα μέλη της - κάτι που δε νομίζω ότι συμβαίνει
β. η ΟΝΕ βάζει τις βάσεις για να διαλυθεί καθώς όλοι καταλαβαίνουν ότι πρόκειται για ετερογενή συνοθύλευμα κι όχι μια ενιαία οντότητα όπως οι ΗΠΑ, ενώ η θεωρία του domino που αναπτύσσεται στο ποστ επιβεβαιώνεται και διάφορες χώρες, κατά σειρά και μετά την Ελλάδα, Ιταλία-Πορτογαλία-Ιρλανδία-Ισπανία-Βέλγιο-Αυστρία-Ολλανδία, ετοιμάζονται να ακολουθήσουν.